1	DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT Department of Industrial Relations		
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3	Los Angeles, California 90012 (213) 897-1511		
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8	BEFORE THE LABOR COMMISSIONER		
9	STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
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12	WESLEY SNIPES,) CASE NO. TAC 36-96	
13	Petitioner,) DETERMINATION	
14	vs.))	
15	DOLORES ROBINSON ENTERTAINMENT, a California corporation; and) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
16	DOLORES ROBINSON, an individual))	
17	Respondents.))	
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19	A Petition to Determine Controversy was filed in this matter on		
20	November 16, 1996. Petitioner [hereinafter referred to as "Snipes"]		
21	alleges, inter alia, therein that respondents [hereinafter collectively		
22	referred to as "Mrs. Robinson"] violated the Talent Agencies Act by acting		
23	in the capacity of a talent agent without being licensed, in violation of		
24	Labor Code section 1700.5. The Petition recites that earlier Mrs.		
25	Robinson filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration		
26	Association seeking commissions allegedly due her pursuant to the written		
27	agreement under which Mrs. Robinson performed the services in question.		
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Snipes seeks a determination from the Labor Commissioner that this written
 agreement is void ab initio and is therefore unenforceable. Snipes also
 seeks restitution of all sums paid to Mrs. Robinson as commissions
 pursuant to the written agreement.

Mrs. Robinson has conceded that she is not a licensed talent agent 5 but denies that she has violated the Talent Agencies Act. She argues that 6 she did not solicit work for Snipes and, in the alternative, that she 7 acted "in conjunction with, and at the request of, a licensed talent 8 agency" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44(d). In addition, 9 she claims that the Petition is barred by the one-year statute of 10 limitations set forth in Labor Code section 1700.44(c) and has requested 11 dismissal of the Petition on this ground. 12

The matter came on for two days of hearing on October 29 and 30,
14 1997, before Thomas S. Kerrigan, Special Hearing Officer, in Los Angeles,
15 California. Snipes appeared through his attorneys, Stanton L. Stein and
16 Karen L. Dillon of Stein & Kahan; Mrs. Robinson appeared through Lawrence
17 Y. Iser and Kristen L. Spanier of Greenberg, Glusker, Fields, Claman &
18 Machtinger. The matter was taken under submission at the close of the
19 hearing.

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ISSUES

The questions presented in this matter are as follows:

1. Did Mrs. Robinson function as a talent agent as defined in the23 Labor Code?

24 2. If so, did Mrs. Robinson act "in conjunction with, and at the 25 request of," a licensed talent agent?

3. Is the Petition barred by the one-year statute of limitations

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1 contained in Labor Code section 1700.44 (c)?¹

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

3 The parties stipulated that at all times material to the allegations 4 of the Petition Snipes was an artist within the meaning of Labor Code 5 section 1700.44 (b) and Mrs. Robinson was not a licensed talent agent.

It is uncontradicted that Snipes was represented by Creative Artists 6 Agency [hereinafter referred to as "CAA"], one of the leading talent 7 agencies in the world, in July of 1990, a time when he was first beginning 8 to attain prominence as a film actor. He expressed the desire at that 9 time to be represented by an artist's manager to Donna Chavous, who was 10 then his representative at CAA. Chavous recommended to Snipes that he 11 meet with Mrs. Robinson. Snipes subsequently met with Mrs. Robinson and 12 decided to retain her as his artist manager. Shortly thereafter, they 13 entered into the aforementioned written agreement. Mrs. Robinson 14 continued to represent Snipes in this capacity until he purported to 15 terminate their relationship in the middle of 1994. 16

There was testimony from Douglas Robinson, Snipes' present agent and 17 no relation to Mrs. Robinson, and Barry Hirsch, Snipes' attorney, that 18 though Mrs. Robinson worked mostly in the personal area for Snipes, she 19 also negotiated major film deals on Snipes' behalf. For example, on the 20 film Water Dance, Mrs. Robinson purportedly negotiated perquisites for 21 Snipes, including travel, housing, per diem, and a rental car, though 22 supposedly not requested by CAA to do so. She also had discussions with 23 the producers of the film Sugar Hill about Snipes' compensation for 24

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26 1 Mrs. Robinson's position in this regard was rejected in an Order Denyi 27 Respondents' Request for Certification of Lack of Controversy, which order antedat the hearing, on the ground that the Petition was filed within one year 28 respondent's demand for arbitration. Her renewed objection on this point is al rejected.

appearing in that film and admitted to Hirsch and Douglas Robinson that 1 she had negotiated the perquisites on that film as well. With respect to 2 the film Star Gate, Mrs. Robinson represented to them that she had 3 received a seven million dollar offer for Snipes' services. She related 4 to them her discussions with the producers of the film White Men Can't 5 Jump about Snipes being "right" for a role in that film. She also told 6 them she had negotiated an Acura automobile for Snipes as compensation for 7 appearing in a Taco Bell commercial. 8

Snipes testified that all proposals for his services went through 9 Mrs. Robinson. He claimed that she promised at the beginning of their 10 relationship to seek opportunities for him in films. He claimed she was 11 the person who was primarily involved in obtaining perquisites for him 12 when he worked on these films, including the employment of trainers, 13 bodyquards, and chefs. He first heard about film projects from Mrs. 14 Robinson, not from his agent. On one film, Demolition Man, she told him 15 she was able to double an offer to Snipes from two million dollars to four 16 million dollars. 17

Chavous, on the other hand, testified that she, Mrs. Robinson, and 18 Barry Hirsch, Snipes' attorney, functioned as a "team" in furthering 19 Snipes' career. To her knowledge, CAA was the only member of the team to 20 solicit deals for Snipes. According to Chavous, Mrs. Robinson worked in 21 the area of attending to Snipes' personal needs after the deal was 22 consummated by Chavous, e.g., making sure he had the proper amenities on 23 the set during filming of a number of motion pictures in which he 24 appeared. 25

26 Mrs. Robinson denied that she negotiated any film deals for Snipes, 27 insisting that she primarily worked in the area of handling personal 28 concerns for Snipes while he was making these films, including interceding

1 when Snipes, his attendants, friends, or family ran into personal 2 difficulties that required attention. Evidence of various incidents that 3 required Mrs. Robinson's intervention in this regard was adduced at the 4 hearing. She admitted that as part of coordinating the efforts on behalf 5 of Snipes career she oversaw the efforts of the other members of the 6 "team" and made suggestions, but that CAA and Hirsch did the direct 7 negotiating on all of Snipes film deals.

There is, as it can be seen, an apparent contradiction between the 8 testimony of Douglas Robinson, Barry Hirsch, and Snipes, on the one hand, 9 and Mrs. Robinson and Donna Chavous, on the other. If the former group of 10 witnesses is to be believed, Mrs. Robinson's actions qualify as those of a 11 talent agent. As counsel for Snipes point out, even negotiations that 12 "exploit" employment offers emanating from the outside constitute 13 prohibited solicitation when done by unlicensed persons within the meaning 14 of the Talent Agency Act (see Hall v. X Management, Inc., T.A.C. 19-90 at 15 pp. 29-30). 16

But if Mrs. Robinson and Donna Chavous were to be discredited in 17 their testimony on this important point, that would not end our inquiry. 18 Mrs. Robinson's second line of defense is that even assuming the Labor 19 Commissioner finds that she acted as a talent agent in negotiating a 20 contract or contracts on behalf of Snipes, she is exempt from the 21 prohibitions of the law under the provisions of Labor Code section 1700.44 22 (d). The assertion of this defense necessitates careful analysis. To 23 qualify under those express provisions requires the satisfaction of a 24 twofold burden of proof, i.e., the person claiming the exemption must 25 prove that he or she acted both (1) "at the request of," and (2) "in 26 conjunction" with, a licensed talent agent during the course of the events 27 in question. 28

Here, the undisputed evidence is that Mrs. Robinson was introduced to 1 Snipes by Donna Chavous, Snipes agent at CAA, and that Ms. Chavous 2 recommended Mrs. Robinson to Snipes for retention as his artist manager. There can accordingly be no question that at least initially Mrs. Robinson was performing her services in response to a request from CAA. Furthermore, there is no evidence that when Douglas Robinson came into the picture that either he or anyone else from CAA asked Mrs. Robinson to cease what she was doing on Snipes' behalf. In fact, the evidence is squarely to the contrary.² Accordingly, it appears clear that Mrs. Robinson performed her functions from 1990 through 1994 at the continuing request of CAA.

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The second requirement of the exemption is that the artist manager ' 12 shows that he or she worked "in conjunction" with the licensed talent 13 The arrangement here commenced, according to the testimony of Mrs. agent. 14 Robinson and Donna Chavous, as a bona fide team undertaking. Donna 15 Chavous was responsible for soliciting work for Snipes and negotiating his 16 contracts and Mrs. Robinson was responsible for handling his personal 17 In this connection Douglas Robinson admitted that after he took affairs. 18 over the account he spoke to Mrs. Robinson on the telephone "ten times a 19 day." The exhibits received in evidence, moreover, show that CAA and 20 Hirsch were intimately involved in all of the negotiations and that Mrs. 21 Robinson was at all times working closely with them. This correspondence 22

2 Though there was testimony that later on CAA never expressly requested 24 Mrs. Robinson to negotiate this or that perquisite, this testimony must be discounted when the entire arrangement between the parties is duly considered. It 25 is understandable that in daily interaction over the course of time during a continuing series of business transactions the parties tend to begin to deal with 26 one another as though certain things were understood. The requirements of the statute cannot be construed to call for a game of "Mother May I?" every time an 27 artist manager takes some action during a long term relationship of the nature reflected in this case. To find otherwise would be to ignore the realities of day 28 to day life in the film industry.

1 may be the most reliable indicator of the true relationship between the 2 parties. When viewed in toto, the evidence therefore establishes that 3 Mrs. Robinson acted in conjunction with CAA in performing services on 4 Snipes behalf.

We accordingly find that Mrs. Robinson did not violate the provisions of the Talent Agencies Act because, whether or not she engaged in or carried on the occupation of an unlicensed talent agent without being licensed within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.5, a disputed factual issue which we do not here resolve, it is clear that she acted at the request of and in conjunction with a licensed talent agent within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.44(d) at all times.

Counsel for Snipes warns that if the exemption contained in section 12 1700.44(d) is found to exist in this case, it will be taken by 13 unscrupulous artist managers as a sign that the law may be circumvented by 14 pro forma alliances between artist managers and licensed talent agents 15 with the result that what would otherwise qualify as violations of the law 16 may go unregulated. While we are cognizant of the possibilities of abuse 17 in this area, the determination here is limited to the facts of this case. 18 The undisputed evidence presented, which was well documented by the 19 correspondence and other exhibits offered by Mrs. Robinson, showed a close 20 and continuing relationship between her organization and one of the most 21 well-known talent agencies in the world. Based on this record we find no 22 showing of either subterfuge or an attempt to circumvent the law. 23

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner is an "artist" within the meaning of Labor Code
 section 1700.44(a). The Labor Commissioner has jurisdiction to determine
 this controversy pursuant to Labor Code section 1700.44(a).

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Respondents acted "in conjunction with, and at the request of,

	1	1 a licensed talent agency" within the meaning of Labor Code section 1700.		
	2	(d) and therefore their actions, if any, in the negotiation of employment		
	3	contracts for petitioner are not unlawful.		
	4	4 DETERMINATION		
	5 Petitioner having failed to sustain its burden of proving that 6 respondents violated Labor Code section 1700.5, the Petition is disr			
	7	with prejudice.		
•	8	DATED: April 1, 1998	DIVISION OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT Department of Industrial Relations State of California	
	10		Games Kenigan	
	11		Thomas S. Kerrigan Special Hearing Officer	
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	14	·	s adopted by the Labor Commissioner in its \sim	
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	16	DATED: April 77, 1998	Jose Millan	
	17		State Labor Commissioner	
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